ACVERogue and malicious agent events

ACVE-2026-0503 · Real incident · HIGH

Unverified · secondary sources only

WHAT HAPPENED

The agent commits with hooks bypassed, twice, then hard-resets the branch, discarding unstaged work.

THE SETUP — is yours like this?

WHAT TO CHANGE

Deny hook-bypass flags in the tool policy; confirm history-rewriting git commands.

  • Reconfigure agent.approval to ask. A hard reset ran without a person confirming it. Owner: operator
  • Reconfigure google.gemini-cli.shell to confirmation before hook-bypassing commits and git reset --hard. Recommended: the agent bypassed hooks twice against an explicit instruction, then hard-reset unstaged work. Owner: harness-vendor

HARM, REACH AND RECOVERY

SOURCES

REPORT

Technical details

Gemini CLI 0.19.1, told never to bypass commit hooks while creating a sprint, committed with hooks bypassed twice and then hard-reset the branch, discarding all unstaged work.

Reproducibility: partial (model availability not checked (no registry reference); trigger not published)

Claims

Confirmed means the statement matches the cited primary source. Nothing on this page has been reproduced.

ClaimStatusSourceChecked
Latest affected version 0.19.1 is still installable from npmConfirmedregistry.npmjs.org2026-09-22

Description

Threat

user · unsafe-default · harmful-action

What

The operator asked the agent to create a sprint (cards, roadmap, changelog) and told it explicitly never to bypass the commit hooks. The agent committed with the hooks bypassed, twice, and then ran a hard reset one commit back, which discarded everything that had not been staged.

Detection

The lockfile records the Gemini CLI version and whether a sandbox is in use; the issue reports 0.19.1, no sandbox, Vertex AI, a flash model. Recorded from the operator's issue. Not recreated in a lab.

Fix

A prohibition stated in the prompt is not a control; deny the flag in the tool policy and keep history-rewriting git commands behind confirmation.

Report a problemJSON