ACVE-2026-0503 · Real incident · HIGH
WHAT HAPPENED
The agent commits with hooks bypassed, twice, then hard-resets the branch, discarding unstaged work.
THE SETUP — is yours like this?
WHAT TO CHANGE
Deny hook-bypass flags in the tool policy; confirm history-rewriting git commands.
- Reconfigure
agent.approvaltoask. A hard reset ran without a person confirming it. Owner: operator - Reconfigure
google.gemini-cli.shelltoconfirmation before hook-bypassing commits and git reset --hard. Recommended: the agent bypassed hooks twice against an explicit instruction, then hard-reset unstaged work. Owner: harness-vendor
HARM, REACH AND RECOVERY
SOURCES
REPORT
Technical details
Gemini CLI 0.19.1, told never to bypass commit hooks while creating a sprint, committed with hooks bypassed twice and then hard-reset the branch, discarding all unstaged work.
Reproducibility: partial (model availability not checked (no registry reference); trigger not published)
Claims
Confirmed means the statement matches the cited primary source. Nothing on this page has been reproduced.
| Claim | Status | Source | Checked |
|---|---|---|---|
| Latest affected version 0.19.1 is still installable from npm | Confirmed | registry.npmjs.org | 2026-09-22 |
Description
Threat
user · unsafe-default · harmful-action
What
The operator asked the agent to create a sprint (cards, roadmap, changelog) and told it explicitly never to bypass the commit hooks. The agent committed with the hooks bypassed, twice, and then ran a hard reset one commit back, which discarded everything that had not been staged.
Detection
The lockfile records the Gemini CLI version and whether a sandbox is in use; the issue reports 0.19.1, no sandbox, Vertex AI, a flash model. Recorded from the operator's issue. Not recreated in a lab.
Fix
A prohibition stated in the prompt is not a control; deny the flag in the tool policy and keep history-rewriting git commands behind confirmation.