{
  "schema_version": "1.6.0",
  "id": "ACVE-2026-0201",
  "aliases": [],
  "published": "2024-06-19T00:00:00Z",
  "firstReported": {
    "date": "2024-06-19",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.13352",
    "publisher": "AgentDojo (arXiv)"
  },
  "modified": "2026-09-25T00:00:00Z",
  "summary": "An agent on any harness and any model, with side-effecting tools auto-approved or allowlisted, reads untrusted content that carries instructions and makes the tool call the content asked for.",
  "details": "## What\n\nText returned by a web page, email, issue or MCP tool can carry instructions the model follows (indirect prompt injection). AgentDojo, InjecAgent, WASP and ASB measure how often it works; the rate moves with model, attack, defence and attempt count (see reference/model-injection-benchmarks.json). A successful injection runs any auto-approved tool with the user's authority.\n\n## Detection\n\nThe lockfile sees an untrusted-input tool, a side-effecting tool and the approval mode; it cannot see what content the agent reads or what task it was given.\n\n## Fix\n\nRequire approval for side-effecting calls, keep reading and acting in separate agents, or restrict the tool set per task: on the AgentDojo leaderboard tool_filter took GPT-4o from 47.69% to 6.84% targeted ASR.\n",
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "AgentHarness",
        "name": "claude-code"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "AgentHarness",
        "name": "codex-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "AgentHarness",
        "name": "cursor"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "AgentHarness",
        "name": "gemini-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "AgentHarness",
        "name": "copilot-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "AgentHarness",
        "name": "vscode-copilot-chat"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "AgentHarness",
        "name": "claude-desktop"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ARTICLE",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.13352"
    },
    {
      "type": "ARTICLE",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.02691"
    },
    {
      "type": "ARTICLE",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.18575"
    },
    {
      "type": "ARTICLE",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.02644"
    },
    {
      "type": "EVIDENCE",
      "url": "https://agentdojo.spylab.ai/results/"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "HIGH",
    "acve": {
      "specVersion": 1,
      "status": "candidate",
      "kind": "behavioural",
      "vulnClasses": [
        "prompt-injection-to-tool",
        "over-privileged-combination"
      ],
      "cwe": [
        "CWE-1427"
      ],
      "taxonomy": {
        "owasp_llm": [
          "LLM01"
        ],
        "owasp_asi": [
          "ASI01",
          "ASI02"
        ],
        "atlas": [
          "AML.T0051.001",
          "AML.T0053"
        ]
      },
      "noCveReason": "configuration pattern; no code defect in any one product",
      "threat": {
        "attacker": "content-author",
        "vector": "prompt-injection",
        "outcome": "harmful-action"
      },
      "evidence": [
        {
          "kind": "eval",
          "benchmark": "AgentDojo leaderboard",
          "attack": "important_instructions",
          "defense": "none",
          "metric": "targeted-asr",
          "value": 0.4769,
          "model": {
            "id": "gpt-4o-2024-05-13"
          },
          "date": "2024-06-05",
          "url": "https://agentdojo.spylab.ai/results/",
          "note": "simulated tools; k=1"
        },
        {
          "kind": "eval",
          "benchmark": "AgentDojo leaderboard",
          "attack": "important_instructions",
          "defense": "tool_filter",
          "metric": "targeted-asr",
          "value": 0.0684,
          "model": {
            "id": "gpt-4o-2024-05-13"
          },
          "date": "2024-06-05",
          "url": "https://agentdojo.spylab.ai/results/",
          "note": "simulated tools; k=1; same model and attack with the tool set restricted to the task"
        },
        {
          "kind": "incident",
          "benchmark": "GitHub MCP toxic-flow demonstration",
          "attack": "malicious public issue read by an agent with pre-approved write tools",
          "url": "https://invariantlabs.ai/blog/mcp-github-vulnerability",
          "note": "real tools; see ACVE-2026-0216"
        }
      ],
      "matcher": {
        "all": [
          {
            "some": "tools",
            "where": {
              "field": "untrustedInput",
              "op": "eq",
              "value": true
            }
          },
          {
            "some": "tools",
            "where": {
              "field": "sideEffect",
              "op": "eq",
              "value": true
            }
          },
          {
            "field": "approval",
            "op": "in",
            "value": [
              "never",
              "allowlist"
            ]
          }
        ]
      },
      "fix": {
        "summary": "Require approval for side-effecting tools, or separate or filter the tools.",
        "actions": [
          {
            "type": "reconfigure",
            "target": "agent.approval",
            "to": "ask",
            "why": "A person decides before untrusted content can cause a side effect.",
            "owner": "operator"
          },
          {
            "type": "reconfigure",
            "target": "harness.tools",
            "to": "only the tools the task needs, chosen before untrusted content is read",
            "why": "Recommended: AgentDojo's tool_filter cut GPT-4o's targeted ASR from 47.69% to 6.84%.",
            "owner": "harness-vendor"
          },
          {
            "type": "reconfigure",
            "target": "model.toolResults",
            "to": "instructions inside tool results treated as data",
            "why": "Recommended: the benchmarks show the injection rate moves with the model.",
            "owner": "model-provider"
          }
        ]
      },
      "exposure": {
        "harness": {
          "value": "Any harness that gives one agent a tool that reads untrusted content and a side-effecting tool (the affected list names claude-code, codex-cli, cursor, gemini-cli, copilot-cli, vscode-copilot-chat and claude-desktop)",
          "any": true,
          "status": "confirmed",
          "source": "https://arxiv.org/html/2406.13352"
        },
        "model": {
          "value": "any",
          "any": true,
          "status": "confirmed",
          "source": "https://arxiv.org/html/2406.13352"
        },
        "goal": {
          "value": "Any task that reads untrusted content with side-effecting tools available",
          "stated": false,
          "status": "unconfirmed"
        },
        "tools": {
          "value": "A tool that returns untrusted content (email, web page, issue or MCP tool result) and a side-effecting tool (shell, file write or MCP write); AgentDojo simulates 70 such tools across its workspace, Slack, travel and banking suites",
          "status": "confirmed",
          "source": "https://arxiv.org/html/2406.13352"
        },
        "approval": {
          "value": "Side-effecting tools run with no confirmation or under a broad allowlist; the benchmarks execute every tool call the model emits",
          "mode": "auto-approve",
          "status": "confirmed",
          "source": "https://arxiv.org/html/2406.13352"
        },
        "inputControl": "content-author",
        "agentAction": "The agent calls a side-effecting tool with the arguments the injected text supplied, for example sending the user's security code or a transfer to the attacker.",
        "harm": "harmful-action",
        "divergence": "instruction-followed",
        "reach": {
          "value": "Whatever the side-effecting tools can act on",
          "kinds": [
            "network"
          ],
          "status": "detected",
          "source": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.13352"
        },
        "condition": {
          "value": "When a tool returns content an outsider wrote and side-effecting tools run without confirmation",
          "status": "confirmed",
          "source": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.13352"
        }
      },
      "occurrence": {
        "basis": "demonstrated",
        "reportedBy": "researcher"
      },
      "exploitation": {
        "status": "demonstrated",
        "checkedAt": "2026-09-21T00:00:00Z",
        "sources": [
          {
            "url": "https://invariantlabs.ai/blog/mcp-github-vulnerability",
            "type": "research",
            "note": "researcher demonstration against real GitHub repositories"
          }
        ],
        "kev": {
          "listed": false
        }
      },
      "cveBoundary": "combination",
      "reproducibility": {
        "status": "partial",
        "axesComplete": true,
        "componentsObtainable": null,
        "triggerPublished": true,
        "observableStated": true,
        "demonstrated": "researcher-demonstrated",
        "missing": [
          "model availability not checked (no registry reference)"
        ]
      },
      "claims": [],
      "severityBasis": "eval-asr"
    }
  }
}
